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NOTES AND COMMENTS
status before it will hold the carrier responsible for the duties imposed
by reason of the carrier-passenger relationship.
HORACE E. STACY, JR.
Torts-Doctor's Liability for "Unauthorized Operations"
While performing an authorized appendectomy on the plaintiff, de-
fendant doctor punctured cysts on the plaintiff's left ovary and drained
fluid therefrom. He is charged with assault and trespass for performing
the unauthorized cyst punctures.' Plaintiff's testimony indicated express
consent only to the removal of the appendix. Defendant's evidence did
not controvert this but showed by five duly qualified medical experts that
the puncture of such cysts during an appendectomy is good surgical prac-
tice performed in such situations. No emergency immediately endanger-
ing the health of the patient was shown. Plaintiff appeals from the
entry of nonsuit taken after the presentation of the above evidence. The
decision of the lower court was affirmed on appeal.2
"In such case the consent-in absence of proof to the contrary-
will be construed as general in nature and the surgeon may extend
the operation to remedy any abnormal or diseased condition in the
area of the original incision whenever he, in the exercise of his
sound professional judgment, determines that correct surgical pro-
cedure dictates and requires such an extension of the operation
originally contemplated."8
There seems to be no disagreement among the cases that consent in
some form must be present for any operation.4 The form that this con-
sent takes is generally spoken of as either express consent or implied
consent.
Express consent is usually found when a very broad, general assent
is given to the physician wherein he is told to remedy the situation5 or
to do whatever is necessary to give relief.6 Consent to one operation is
not, however, consent to a second.7 Nor can a surgeon, during an
' Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1956). An allegation of
negligence in the cutting of a blood vessel on the ovary resulting in phlebitis of the
left leg was not urged on appeal although mentioned in the pleadings and in the trial
below. [Record, p. 3.]
'Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1956). Cf. RESTATEMENT,
ToRts § 62, illustration 5 (1934).
Id. at 362, 90 S. E. 2d at 759.
'Wells v. Van Nort, 100 Ohio St. 101, 125 N. E. 910 (1919) ; White v. Hirsh-
field, 108 Okla. 263, 236 Pac. 406 (1925) ; Valdey v. Percy, 35 Cal. App. 2d 485,
96 P. 2d 142 (1939); Wall v. Brim, 138 F. 2d 478 (1943).
McClallen v. Adams, 36 Mass. (19 Pick) 333, 31 Am. Dec. 140 (1837) ; King
v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 Pac. 270 (1922) ; Rothe v. Hull, 352 Mo. 926, 180 S. W.
2d 7 (1944).
'McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 Atl. 124 (1930).
'Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N. E. 562 (1906).
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authorized operation on the plaintiff's hand, take fascia lata from the
thigh even though good surgery justifies such a taking.8 But a doctor is
authorized to reopen an incision without additional authority if he 1te-
lieves a needle was left within the patient's body.9 The surgeon has no
defense of consent, however, when the wrong person is treated even
though the patient, trusting the physician, allows him to proceed without
protest.10 If the wrong member of the body is operated on, the surgeon
cannot be excused by showing permission to operate elsewhere; as where
surgeon was held liable for an unauthorized tonsillectomy, and the consent
was to operate on the septum of patient's nose."1 Of course an entirely
different operation cannot be performed 12 even though benefit may be
shown to have resulted. 3 A specific prohibition to an operating surgeon
not to remove any bone or part of a bone during a foot operation cannot
be disregarded by the surgeon. 14 Nor can the sphincter muscle be cut
when doctor is told specifically not to sever it.1' Even more obvious,
consent to a small operation is not consent to a larger, more serious
operation. 16 As can be seen from these few examples, the express con-
sent decision often involves a determination of the extent of the patient's
permission as reasonably deduced from the patient's conduct under the
circumstances or from the actual agreement of the parties.
On the other hand, most of the so-called implied consent cases arise
where an emergency or unforeseen situation exists and the doctor takes
certain remedial action without any consent whatsoever. The very use
of the term "implied consent" is erroneous here; it is ". . . a fiction, since
consent does not exist, and there is no act which indicates it. It is more
accurate here ...to say that the defendant is privileged because he is
reasonably entitled to assume consent, and to act as if it had been given."'
17
'Franklyn v. Peabody, 249 Mich. 363, 228 N. W. 681 (1930).
'Higley v. Jeffrey, 44 Wyo. 37, 8 P. 2d 96 (1932).
"0 Gill v. Selling, 125 Ore. 587, 267 Pac. 812 (1928) ; Samuelson v. Taylor, 160
Wash. 369, 295 Pac. 113 (1931). As to inferences of assent drawn from submis-
sion, see Knowles v. Blue, 209 Ala. 27, 95 So. 481 (1923); Baxter v. Snow, 78
Utah 217, 2 P. 2d 257 (1931).
" Hively v. Higgs, 120 Ore. 588, 253 Pac. 363 (1927). See also, Hershey v.
Peake, 115 Kan. 562, 223 Pac. 1113 (1924) ; Sullivan v. McGraw, 118 Mich. 39,
76 N. W. 149 (1898) ; Krompoltz v. Hyman, 70 Pa. Super. Ct. 581 (1919) ; Mohr
v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N. W. 12 (1905).
" Wells v. Van Nort, 100 Ohio St., 125 N. E. 910 (1919) ; Maercklein v. Smith,
129 Colo. 72, 266 P. 2d 1095 (1954) ; see also Markart v. Zeimer, 67 Cal. App. 363,
227 Pac. 683 (1924). As in the cases in note 11 supra, the malpractice-negligence
cases and the assault and battery cases are hard to distinguish at times. This is
often important in connection with the running of the statute of limitations which
may be different for the two causes of action.
13 Church v. Adler, 350 Ill. App. 471, 113 N. E. 2d 327 (1953).
Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 96 (1913).
1 Luzzi v. Priester, 295 S. W. 958 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), a malpractice suit.
10 Paulsen v. Gundersen, 218 Wis. 578, 260 N. W. 448 (1935). Cf. Robinson
v. Crotwell, 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23 (1911) ; Zoterell v. Repp, 187 Mich. 319, 153
N. W. 692 (1915).
17 PROSsER, TORTS § 18, p. 84 (2d ed. 1955). Also see RESTATEMENT, TORTS,
Special Note § 62 at 116 (1934).
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The emergency or unanticipated condition generally must endanger the
patient's life or health in some immediate fashion; as where acute appen-
dicitis which endangered the mother and child was discovered during a
duly authorized operation for a tubal pregnancy.1 8 With this implied
consent raised by an emergency or danger to life and health and without
any direct, express consent whatsoever, it has been held that a surgeon
may amputate an arm which was badly injured,19 that a more serious
rupture on the right side of the groin could be remedied 6ven though
specific permission was only for the correction of the less serious left side
rupture,20 that a surgeon could operate to remove an obstruction in the
urinary system which the surgeon himself had introduced thereinto, 21
and that a mangled and crushed foot could be amputated.22 If the trier
of facts denominates the situation as "emergency" this is enough to up-
hold defendant's verdict on appeal as to implied consent.
23
In every case in the above paragraph which found that there was im-
plied consent, the element of emergency or danger to life or health was
present.
Other cases have used the term implied consent in a slightly different
way; as where a mother's consent to an operation on her child was con-
sidered as implying consent of the child.2 4 But, in the usual use of the
term the consent arises from the presence of emergency or possible dire
results. Most of the cases listed which denied an implied consent did so
expressly because there was no emergency. It seems in one case that
Justice Cardozo lists "emergency" as the only direct exception to the
express consent rule.235 A recent Kentucky case states directly that a
mere endangering of the patient's life or health some time in the future
is not such an emergency as would imply consent presently.2 6 It will be
noted that in the principal case, the testimony of the expert witnesses
was that the cysts were certainly not immediately dangerous. The de-
fendant himself testified:
"I say they [the cysts] were dangerous. I can't say how long it
would have been before she would have had to have an operation;
it possibly could have been two or three months before it would
have been necessary for her to have had an operation. It is pos-
" Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A. 2d 626 (D. C. Mun. App. 1943) ; see also Sullivan
v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279 N. Y. Supp. 575 (1935).J' ackovach v. Yocum, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N. W. 444 (1931).
_- Bennan v. Parsonnett, 83 N. J. L. 20, 83 At. 948 (1912).
.
1Delahunt v. Finton, 244 Mich. 226, 221 N. W. 168 (1928).
22Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N. W. 1106 (1912).
"Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A. 2d 626 (D. C. Mun. App. 1943).
24 Barfield v. South Highlands Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915).
-' Schloendorff v. N. Y. Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914).
"Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S. W. 2d 474 (Ky. 1951).
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sible if I had not done anything to this ovary or ovaries, that she
might never have had to have an operation.
27
The expert witnesses testified to the effect that "[ilt is the accepted
theory to puncture them whether they are dangerous or not."28  (Em-
phasis added.) The customary and usual practice of surgeons was estab-
lished; that surgeons usually remedy such conditions is adequately
shown.29  But no emergency or immediate danger was shown. It is
submitted that the principal case goes further in "implying" consent80
in a non-emergency, non-danger situation than any previous case.8 1
The basis of the North Carolina court's decision, then, would not
seem to be any "emergency" theory. The court, rather, believes that
modem medical practice with its use of anaesthesia and isolated operating
rooms demands that some change be made in the former strict consent
rules. It quotes extensively from Bennan v. Parsonnet,32 a New Jersey
case, to show the historic development of modern surgery and the need
for a change in the law. The rule as quoted in the first paragraph above
is then stated with a citation to three cases.83 It is interesting to note
that two of the three cases and the Bennan case were "emergency" or
"danger to life and health" types of cases; the other case was a "volun-
tary submission" case.
34
The consent raised from this non-emergency, modern medicine doc-
trine allows the surgeons themselves to establish the limits as to what a
given operation should cover once the surgeon sees the exact internal
condition after incision. Some latitude is necessary, certainly. The facts
of the principal case as presented by the five experts seem to make a
case for such freedom. The limits of this type of consent still have to
be drawn. How far afield may the surgeon go in remedying non-
emergency situations? The limiting line in emergency cases is not im-
2" Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1956), [Record, p. 30.]
28 Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1956), [Record, p. 48;
also pp. 34, 38, 42 and 51.]
"0 See Russell v. Jackson, 37 Wash. 2d 66, 221 P. 2d 516 (1950), where physi-
cians testified that if a cyst on an ovary is discovered during an operation it is com-
mon practice to remove it.
'0 It is realized that the term "implied consent" is specifically-and correctly-
avoided by the North Carolina court as a "fetish," Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C.
355, 361; 90 S. E. 2d 754, 758, but for uniformity's sake the term is used throughout
this note.
"1 Cf. McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N. W. 120 (1929) and Boydston v.
Giltner, 3 Ore. 118 (1869). Although stating rather liberal rules to absolve the
physician, both cases differ in their holdings from the principal case. See REsTATE-
M.tENT, TORTS §§ 54 and 62 (1934).
2283 N. J. L. 20, 83 Atl. 948 (1912).
3 King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 Pac. 270 (1922) ; Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah
217, 2 P. 2d 257 (1931) ; Jackovach v. Yocum, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N. W. 444 (1931).
" Baxter v. Snow stated, inter alia, that voluntary'submission to a physician
for diagnosis and treatment would raise a presumption of consent absent contrary
evidence. See note 10 supra.
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possible to draw since it will extend only to the affected area, but where
this emergency boundary is not present some difficulty will be encoun-
tered. It remains to be seen how the court will handle an extension
which is not so universally conceded by the medical experts to be the((usual practice of surgeons."
The general rule still subsists that "every human being of adult years
and a sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his pa-
tient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.
35
To this the North Carolina court quickly would add, however, that once
the general permission is given, the doctor may operate as good surgery
demands, correcting also certain other situations even if no dire emer-
gency is present. The limiting boundaries are still to be delineated.
WILLIAM P. SKINNER, JR.
Trial Practice-Hearings for a New Trial-Right of Trial Court to
Take Testimony Outside the Record and to Deny the Right of Cross
Examination
In North Carolina,' as in many other jurisdictions,2 the trial court
has the inherent power to set aside a verdict and order a new trial.3
Where there is no question of law or legal inference ihvolved in a motion
for a new trial, it is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge
whose ruling, in the absence of abuse, is not reviewable on appeal. 4 This
power is considered essential for the orderly administration of justice
since the judge is in a position to observe the trial objectively and protect
the proceedings from unfair influences which may never appear in the
record.5 Since the judge may exercise his discretion and give no reasons
" Schloendorff v. N. Y. Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 129; 105 N. E. 92, 93 (1914)
(a much quoted phrase of Justice Cardozo).
'Bird v. Bradburn, 131 N. C. 488, 42 S. E. 936 (1902).
" Common law authority of a trial court to set aside a verdict and order a new
trial is inherent in all courts of common law in the United States. 39 Af. JUR.,
New Trial § 4 (1942).
' This common law power has been partially codified in N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-207
which specifically sets out the trial courts' right to set aside a verdict and grant a
new trial upon exceptions, insufficient evidence, or for excessive damages.
' Muse v. Muse, 234 N. C. 205, 66 S. E. 2d 689 (1951) ; Pruitt v. Ray, 230 N. C.
322, 52 S. E. 2d 876 (1949).
Speaking of the judge's duty to set the verdict aside when he perceives that
justice has not been done, the court said: "His discretion to do so is not limited to
cases in which there has been a miscarriage of justice by reason of the verdict
having been against the weight of the evidence (in which, of course, he will be
reluctant to set his opinion against that of twelve), but he may perceive that there
has been prejudice in the community which has affected the jurrors, possibly un-
known to themselves, but perceptible to the judge-who is usually a stranger-or
a very able lawyer has procured an advantage over an inferior one, an advantage
legitimate enough in him, but which has brought about a result which the judge
sees is contrary to justice. In such, and, many other instances which would not
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